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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0066  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000083

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SUBJECT: JANUARY 2010 U.S.-SINGAPORE COUNTERPROLIFERATION  
DIALOGUE SCENESETTER

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[B](#). 09 SINGAPORE 612  
[C](#). 09 SINGAPORE 1217  
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[1](#). (S) SUMMARY: Singapore will host the third U.S.-Singapore Counterproliferation (CP) Dialogue January 26-27, providing an opportunity to review bilateral CP cooperation, and to urge Singapore to take a more proactive and visible approach to combating proliferation. In the context of excellent overall bilateral relations, Singapore is a reliable CP partner in the region and abides by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Still, Singapore maintains positive and active economic relations with countries such as Iran, Burma and the DPRK, and prioritizes the preeminence of its highly efficient and economically critical port and its role as a financial services hub in Asia. Singapore has often taken a risk-averse and legalistic approach to export control investigations and interdictions of suspect shipments, especially cases involving dual-use goods and entities not subject to UN sanctions. Singapore has been cooperative when provided with actionable intelligence regarding serious and urgent cases. Recently, Singapore has taken a more active role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Government of Singapore (GOS) officials have been more open to discussing CP issues. The CP Dialogue is an opportunity to review: Singapore's contributions to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); its efforts to bolster its export control regime; and Singapore's cooperation on key export control cases. It is also a chance to urge Singapore to join certain multilateral counterproliferation initiatives and take a more proactive approach to monitoring and interdicting transit and transshipped cargo. End Summary.

Progress Since the Last CP Dialogue

[2](#). (S) Singapore will host the third installment of the Counterproliferation (CP) Dialogue January 26-27. The last Dialogue was held in Washington in June 2007. LIM Kheng Hua, Director in MFA's International Organizations Directorate, will chair Singapore's interagency delegation, which will include representatives from MFA, the Ministry of Defense (MinDef), Singapore Customs, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, Attorney General's Chambers (AGC), and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority.

13. (S) Since the last CP Dialogue Singapore has made significant progress in its CP efforts. Key examples include:

-- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) - Singapore is a strong participant in PSI and hosted its second PSI exercise, DEEP SABRE II, in October 2009. Approximately 2,000 participants from military, diplomatic, legal, customs, immigration, and civil defense agencies representing 21 countries attended the multi-phase exercise. DEEP SABRE II included table top exercises, policy discussion, and boarding and port search demonstrations for Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Explosive (CBRE) materials. The exercise was organized into three concurrent phases: tabletop exercise (TTX); demonstration of command and control capabilities of ship traffic in the Straits of Malacca using the multilateral Information Fusion Center at the Command and Control (C2) Center; and demonstration of CBRE detection in shipping containers. The exercise resulted in a better U.S. understanding of Singapore's detection capabilities and the challenges that it faces in regard to proliferation security.

-- Response to UNSCR 1874 - In response to last June's UNSCR 1874 regarding DPRK proliferation activities, Singapore enacted new financial regulations to give effect to both UNSCR 1874 and UNSCR 1718. The new regulations proscribe imports and exports of certain items to and from North Korea and require financial institutions in Singapore to freeze assets of designated entities or entities acting on behalf of designated entities, and inform MAS of any funds, assets, transactions or proposed transactions. Ambassador Philip Goldberg, U.S. Coordinator for Implementation of UNSCR 1874,

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actions can be limited by GOS legal restrictions. Singapore authorities have been unable to cooperate on specific cases because of a lack of legal authority. The United States and Singapore do not have a bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) or a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). In addition, our extradition treaty with Singapore predates the advent of much proliferation activity and does not cover crimes associated with proliferation. Singapore is a participant in the Container Security Initiative, and U.S. officials in the program have had an excellent relationship with their counterparts at the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority. We have approached Singapore about expanding Megaports, but port authorities put off any discussion of expansion until port volumes improve. They have signaled reluctance to implement measures that would detract from the port's efficiency.

17. (S) Singapore supports, in principle, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (HCOC) but has not endorsed either initiative. Emboffs joined Australian, Russian and Japanese officials in April and September 2009 to urge Singapore to endorse GICNT, but Singapore officials said that they had no immediate plans to sign on, citing manpower and resource constraints at their agencies. GOS agencies are leanly staffed, but 2009 was a particularly challenging year because Singapore hosted a PSI exercise and hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings. Now that these major commitments have passed, the feeling of manpower and resource constraints may have eased somewhat and the GOS might be more open to endorsing GICNT, or at least participating where it can as an observer to see firsthand what its obligations would be under GICNT.

Singapore More Vocal

18. (S) Developments in Iran's nuclear production have spurred GOS officials to be more vocal in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and International Atomic Energy Agency.

Singapore typically votes with its fellow NAM members, but disassociated itself from the group on two proliferation issues in 2009, making clear that it does not view counterproliferation as a NAM issue. Singapore declined to support an Iranian proposal in September to ban military strikes against nuclear facilities that the NAM had supported, and in November together with Chile blocked NAM consensus on a letter on UNSCR 1887 regarding nonproliferation that supported Iranian positions.

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